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Abstract
This paper studies whether debt renegotiation mitigates debt overhang and improves
investment eﬃciency. Using mergers between lenders participated in the same syndi-
cated loans as natural experiments that exogenously reduce the number of lenders and
thus make renegotiation easier, I ﬁnd that ﬁrms aﬀected by the mergers experience
more loan renegotiations and increase capital expenditure investment. I also ﬁnd that
the eﬀect is stronger for ﬁrms with higher Q, suggesting improved investment eﬃciency.
Further evidence suggests that the eﬀect concentrates on loans without performance
pricing provisions and unsecured loans, providing further support that lender mergers
improves investment eﬃciency for ﬁrms suﬀering from debt overhang ex ante.
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1 Introduction
Myers (1977) argues that risky debt may cause ﬁrms to forego positive net present value
investment opportunities because shareholders have to share the returns from such invest-
ment with creditors, a phenomenon known as debt overhang. Myers (1977) also recognizes
that a necessary condition for debt overhang is frictions that can prevent ex post debt renego-
tiation. If shareholders and creditors can renegotiate ex post without much cost, shareholders
can get concessions from creditors and commit to invest. As Myers (1977) puts it, renegotia-
tion can lead to “an arrangement in which creditors accept less than the face amount of their
securities in exchange for the owner’s commitment to put up funds for future investment.” In
fact, Roberts and Suﬁ (2009) and Roberts (2015) ﬁnd that many debt renegotiations occur
outside of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy and often lead to additional credit and reduced
interest rates, which is consistent with the idea that creditors give concessions to clear the
way for future investment.
The idea that debt renegotiation can resolve the debt overhang problem is formally mod-
eled in Aivazian and Callen (1980) and Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), who show that debt
renegotiation mitigates underinvestment and restores investment eﬃciency. More recently,
Arnold and Westermann (2015) show that covenant renegotiation may resolve agency cost
of debt, including debt overhang. The theory, as is well developed and easily understood,
however, has never been directly tested.
One challenge to empirically test the eﬀect of renegotiation on debt overhang is often the
lack of exogenous variation in the ability to renegotiate debt contracts. On one hand, debt
contracts are often designed to mitigate potential agency costs of the debt, including debt
overhang (Myers 1977, Smith and Warner 1979, and Suﬁ 2007), and therefore the ability to
renegotiate debt contracts ex post can be correlated with ﬁrm characteristics that also aﬀect
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the potential agency cost of debt overhang ex ante, such as investment opportunities. As a
result, examining contractual terms that may aﬀect the easiness of debt renegotiation may
not be able to identify the causal eﬀect of debt renegotiation. On the other hand, actual
events of debt renegotiations are often driven by ﬁrm characteristics and macroeconomic
conditions, all of which can aﬀect investment as well. As such, examining the impact of
actual renegotiation events also may not identify the causal eﬀect of debt renegotiation.
In this paper, I overcome the challenge by exploiting exogenous variation in the ability
to renegotiate debt contracts generated by mergers between lenders of the same ﬁrms. Loan
contract renegotiations, especially those involving loan amount, loan maturity, or loan in-
terest rate, often require unanimous consent of all lenders participated in the loan (Wight,
Cooke, and Gray 2009 and Nikolaev 2015). Because each single lender can hold up the rene-
gotiation, increasing the number of lenders makes such renegotiations more diﬃcult (Gertner
and Scharfstein 1991, Berglo¨f and Von Thadden 1994, Bolton and Scharfstein 1996, and Bris
and Welch 2005). When two lenders participated in the same loan merge, the total number
of lenders decreases by one, and renegotiation becomes easier. On the other hand, bank
mergers are unlikely to be motivated by factors related to the aﬀected borrowers because
each lender often lends to many borrowers but the number of aﬀected borrowers is often
much smaller. As such, mergers between lenders participated in the same syndicated loans
are likely to satisfy both the relevance and the exclusion conditions. I therefore use the lender
mergers as natural experiments to identify the causal eﬀect of the ability to renegotiate loan
contracts on debt overhang.
Speciﬁcally, I ﬁrst identify all mergers between ﬁnancial ﬁrms in SDC from 1987 to 2012;
I then match the names of the acquirers and the targets of the mergers with lender names
in DealScan. I identify all outstanding syndicated loans in which both the acquirer and
the target participated and designate the borrowers of such loans as treated ﬁrms. To ﬁnd
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control ﬁrms, I ﬁrst require the control ﬁrms to also borrow from either the acquirer or the
target of the merger (but not from both), and then require the control ﬁrms to be in the
same two-digit industries and to be in the same terciles sorted on ﬁrm size, Tobin’s Q, and
cash ﬂow.
I ﬁrst show, using the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences method, that the incidence of loan renego-
tiations increases for treated ﬁrms after the lender mergers. In particular, I show that lender
mergers positively aﬀect loan renegotiations involving changes in loan pricing, maturity, or
amount, which often require unanimous lender consent, but not other types of renegotia-
tions. The result is consistent with the argument that these lender mergers, by reducing the
number of lenders, are more likely to aﬀect renegotiations that require unanimity.
In the same diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences framework, I ﬁnd that treated ﬁrms increase capital
expenditure investment, relative to control ﬁrms, after the merger. The result is consistent
with the argument that lender mergers decrease the number of lenders and make ex post
loan renegotiation easier, which then facilitates the transfer of wealth from creditors to
shareholders and mitigates debt overhang.
To ensure that easier loan renegotiation triggered by the lender mergers indeed causes
increases in corporate investment, I further examine the impact of loan renegotiation on
corporate investment using an instrumental variable approach, in which the lender mergers
are used as the instrument for loan renegotiation. Consistent with the idea that lender
mergers make loan renegotiations easier and hence increase corporate investment, I ﬁnd that
the exogenous component of loan renegotiations due to the lender mergers has a positive
eﬀect on corporate capital investment.
The positive eﬀect of lender mergers on investment can also be driven by lenders’ increased
incentives to monitor, which may also lead to more eﬃcient investment. To rule out this
possibility, I exclude cases in which one of the merging lenders is the lead lender of the
3
syndicated loan. In syndicated loans, monitoring responsibilities are often delegated to lead
lenders, and therefore monitoring increases only when the lead lenders’ shares in the loan
increase as a result of the mergers. However, after excluding mergers involving lead lenders,
I still ﬁnd the same positive eﬀect of participant lender mergers on corporate investment,
suggesting that the baseline results are unlikely to be driven by increased lender monitoring.
To further examine whether the increases in investment indeed improves investment ef-
ﬁciency (as opposed to overinvestment), I investigate whether the positive eﬀect of lender
mergers on corporate investment is stronger for ﬁrms with higher Tobin’s Q, a proxy for in-
vestment opportunities. Speciﬁcally, I partition the sample according to whether the ﬁrm’s
Q is above or below the sample median and ﬁnd that the positive eﬀect concentrates in ﬁrms
with above-median Q’s. The result suggests that lender mergers increase investment for
ﬁrms who have good investment opportunities but are unable (or unwilling) to invest other-
wise due to debt overhang. The result is therefore consistent with the argument that lender
mergers, which make renegotiation easier, mitigate debt overhang and improve investment
eﬃciency.
I provide two additional tests to ensure that the eﬀect is indeed driven by the mitigation
of debt overhang. In the ﬁrst test, I examine whether the existence of performance pricing
provisions alters the impact of lender mergers on corporate investment. Performance pricing
provisions in loan contracts allow loan interest rates to change according to ﬁrm performance
and credit risk. Speciﬁcally, loan interest rates decrease when ﬁrm performance improves and
credit risk decreases. By design, performance pricing can alleviate the debt overhang problem
because lenders receive lower returns from new investment even if such investment improves
ﬁrm performance and reduces credit risk. It follows that loans with performance pricing
provisions make debt overhang less of a problem, and therefore the lender mergers should
have a smaller, if any, eﬀect on corporate investment. To this end, I partition the sample into
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two subsamples according to whether the loans have performance pricing provisions. I indeed
ﬁnd that the lender mergers have no eﬀect on investment for ﬁrms with loans containing
performance pricing provisions and have a stronger eﬀect for loans without performance
pricing provisions, lending further support that the eﬀect is driven by the mitigation of debt
overhang when the loans do not have performance pricing provisions.
In the second test, I examine whether secured or unsecured loans make a diﬀerence.
Values of secured loans depend largely on their collateral, which are arguably less sensitive
to future investment the ﬁrms may make. As such, new investment may beneﬁt the secured
loan lenders less, which mitigates the debt overhang problem (Stulz and Johnson 1985).
Because secured loans do not cause severe debt overhang ex ante, lender mergers should
have a much smaller, if any, eﬀect on corporate investment if the loans are secured. To test
this conjecture, I partition the sample according to whether the loans are secured or not, and
investigate the eﬀect of lender mergers on corporate investment for these two subsamples.
Consistent with the conjecture, I indeed ﬁnd that the positive eﬀect of lender mergers on
investment only present in ﬁrms with unsecured loans but not for ﬁrms with secured loans,
lending further support to the argument that lender mergers mitigate debt overhang and
therefore increase corporate investment.
A common concern for the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation is that the results may be
driven by inherent diﬀerences between treated and control ﬁrms, that is, treated and control
ﬁrms may have diﬀerent dynamics of corporate investment in the absence of lender mergers.
To mitigate such a concern, I ﬁrst plot the trend of corporate investment of the treated and
control ﬁrms separately over the six-year window and show that the treated and control
ﬁrms have similar trends before the lender mergers. I then conduct a standard falsiﬁcation
test in which I examine the eﬀect of ﬁctional mergers, occurring four years before the actual
mergers, on corporate investment while maintaining the assignment of treated and control
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ﬁrms. If the baseline results are driven by the inherent diﬀerences between treated and
control ﬁrms, the eﬀect is also likely to show up in the falsiﬁcation test. In contrast, I ﬁnd
no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of these ﬁctional mergers in the falsiﬁcation test, suggesting
that the baseline results are unlikely to be driven by non-parallel trends between treated and
control ﬁrms.
A second threat to the identiﬁcation comes from the possibility that lender mergers may
be correlated with unobservable investment opportunities, especially those not captured
by Tobin’s Q. For example, lenders of borrowers with good investment opportunities may
proactively pursue mergers, which then introduces the reverse causality problem. A direct
implication of the concern is that lender mergers should aﬀect not only capital expenditure
investment but also other types of investments as well. On the other hand, however, if lender
mergers increase capital investment via their mitigation of debt overhang, lender mergers
may not aﬀect R&D investment or acquisition expenses. R&D investment is risky and
therefore may not beneﬁt creditors as much as capital expenditure investment. Acquisitions,
as shown in Billett, King, and Mauer (2004), in fact destroy creditor value. Therefore,
R&D investment and acquisition expenses may not be subject to debt overhang.1 To this
end, I investigate whether lender mergers have a similar impact on R&D and acquisition
expenses. Inconsistent with the idea that lender mergers may be correlated with investment
opportunities, the lender mergers have no eﬀect on R&D investment and have a negative
eﬀect on acquisition expenses. The results therefore suggest that the baseline results of the
positive eﬀect of lender mergers on capital expenditure investment are unlikely to be driven
by the correlation between lender mergers and unobservable investment opportunities.
This paper is the ﬁrst to test the impact of ex post debt renegotiation on debt overhang.
1This argument does not rule out the possibility that leverage may negatively aﬀect R&D investment or
acquisition expenses. It only states that leverage does not aﬀect R&D investment and acquisition expenses
via the debt overhang channel.
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While previous studies show that ﬁrms more subject to debt overhang ex ante may design
debt contracts that can be more easily renegotiated (Myers 1977, Aivazian and Callen 1980,
Suﬁ 2007, and Christensen and Nikolaev 2012), they provide no direct evidence of the eﬀect
of renegotiation on debt overhang. The analysis of debt renegotiation in Roberts and Suﬁ
(2009) and Roberts (2015) suggests that debt renegotiation may be used to resolve the
debt overhang problem, but they also provide no direct evidence, especially no direct causal
evidence, that debt renegotiation mitigates debt overhang.
This paper contributes more generally to the literature on the eﬀects of debt enforcement.
For example, Anderson and Sundaresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Fan and
Sundaresan (2000), and Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) investigate the impact of debt
enforcement on either ex ante strategic default incentives or ex post liquidation eﬃciency
for ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress. Other papers have also looked at the implications of debt
enforcement or creditor rights on asset pricing (Garlappi, Shu, and Yan 2008, Garlappi and
Yan 2011, Hackbarth, Haselmann, and Schoenherr 2015 and Favara, Schroth, and Valta
2012). While these studies all take the asset side of the ﬁrms as given, I show in this paper
that debt renegotiation can aﬀect corporate investment, and hence the asset side of the
balance sheet.
Several recent studies investigate the impact of debt enforcement on investment. For
example, Becker and Stro¨mberg (2012) show that managerial ﬁduciary duties to creditors for
ﬁrms in distress mitigate both underinvestment and risk-shifting incentives. Alanis, Chava,
and Kumar (2015) ﬁnd that shareholder bargaining power (against bondholders) in default
can dampen underinvestment induced by debt overhang. Favara et al. (2016) show that an
imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default induces leveraged ﬁrms to invest more,
suggesting that allocating more control rights to shareholders in bankruptcy mitigates debt
overhang. Diﬀerent from the existing literature, which mostly focuses on debt enforcement
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in default, this paper focuses on debt renegotiation that may happen outside of distress
or default. This paper also diﬀers from these papers by using lender mergers to generate
exogenous variation in loan renegotiability and therefore is able to identify the causal eﬀect
of debt renegotiation on debt overhang.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses; section
3 describes the natural experiment and sample construction; section 4 presents the main
empirical results, section 5 presents some robustness test results; and section 6 concludes.
2 Hypotheses
Lender mergers can aﬀect corporate investment via three diﬀerent channels, which I
call the renegotiation eﬃciency hypothesis, the renegotiation opportunistic underinvestment
hypothesis, and the monitoring hypothesis.
The renegotiation eﬃciency hypothesis stems from the well-known debt overhang problem
of Myers (1977), that is, ﬁrms underinvest in low-risk projects because shareholders do not
capture all the returns of such investment and part of the returns goes to the creditors, even
when such investment beneﬁts the ﬁrm as a whole. However, as Myers (1977) himself notes
that ex post renegotiation may lead to “an arrangement in which creditors accept less than
the face amount of their securities in exchange for the owner’s commitment to put up funds
for future investment”, that is, ex post renegotiation may mitigate debt overhang and restore
investment eﬃciency. This argument is formally modeled in Aivazian and Callen (1980) and
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), who show that easier renegotiation increases investment
eﬃciency for ﬁrms with good investment opportunities.
Empirically, Roberts and Suﬁ (2009) and Roberts (2015) show that debt contract renego-
tiations, especially those outside of distress or default, often result in lower interest rates and
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additional credit when ﬁrms’ assets increase and credit risk decreases. With renegotiation,
Shareholders will therefore be able to capture a larger fraction of the returns of investments
that increase asset base and reduce credit risk of the ﬁrm, and hence will have more incen-
tives to invest. It follows that lender mergers, which reduce the total number of lenders and
make renegotiation easier, should mitigate debt overhang and increase corporate investment,
especially for those with more investment opportunities. Based on this argument, I develop
the following renegotiation eﬃciency hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (Renegotiation Eﬃciency Hypothesis). Due to increased ability to renegotiate
loan contracts, lender mergers should increase investment of aﬀected borrowers, and the eﬀect
should be stronger for ﬁrms with more investment opportunities.
The increased ability to renegotiate loan contracts can also have a negative eﬀect on cor-
porate investment. Bergman and Callen (1991) argue that the possibility of renegotiation
creates the incentive of shareholders to opportunistically underinvest because underinvest-
ment results in fewer assets that can accessed by creditors. Consequently, the ﬁrm can
strategically default to force concessions from the creditors in renegotiation. Based on this
argument, I development the following renegotiation opportunistic underinvestment hypoth-
esis:
Hypothesis 2 (Renegotiation Opportunistic Underinvestment Hypothesis). Due to in-
creased ability to renegotiate loan contracts, lender mergers should decrease investment of
aﬀected borrowers.
Lender mergers, as those explored in this paper, not only decrease the number of lenders
but also increase the concentration of lenders, which can enhance the monitoring incentives
of the merging lenders (Suﬁ 2007 and Ivashina 2009). Increased monitoring, on the other
hand, may either increase investment if the ﬁrm was underinvesting or decrease investment
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if the ﬁrm was overinvesting, that is, the eﬀect of increased lender monitoring due to lender
mergers on investment can go either ways. In syndicated loans, monitoring responsibilities
are often delegated to the lead lenders, and therefore the monitoring eﬀect should only matter
if one of the merging lenders is a lead lender. I therefore develop the following monitoring
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (Monitoring Hypothesis). Due to increased lender monitoring, lender mergers
can either increase or decrease investment of aﬀected borrowers, and the eﬀect should mainly
come from mergers involving lead lenders.
3 Sample Construction and Identiﬁcation Strategy
3.1 Sample Construction
The sample construction starts with all mergers between ﬁnancial ﬁrms from 1987-2012
in the SDC mergers and acquisitions database. I begin the merger sample from 1987 because
only since then the DealScan database starts to have a comprehensive coverage of loans. I
stop the merger sample in 2012 because I need three years of data after the merger in the
analysis. In the second step, I obtain lenders’ information from the LPC DealScan database,
and match the lender names with the names of the acquirers and the targets of the ﬁnancial
mergers. In matching acquirer names, I not only match the names of the lenders directly
involved in the merger, but also match the names of the parent companies of the lenders
and acquirers. Wherever possible, I use the addresses of the companies in both databases
to facilitate the match. I then retain all mergers for which both the acquirer and the target
can be matched with lenders in the DealScan database. All matches are manually checked
to ensure accuracy. This procedure produces a sample of 877 mergers between lenders in the
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Dealscan database.
The next step is to identify ﬁrms aﬀected by these mergers, that is, to ﬁnd the treated
ﬁrms. I require that the treated ﬁrm to have an outstanding loan of which both the acquirer
and the target of the merger are lenders. I exclude ﬁrms in ﬁnancial and utility industries
and ﬁrms with missing key variables. This procedure produces a sample of 1,326 treated
ﬁrms involved in 45 mergers. On average, each merger aﬀects about thirty ﬁrms. However,
the median number of ﬁrms aﬀected by a merger is only seven. The distribution of the
mergers across time is presented in Table 1. The mergers are fairly evenly distributed across
time, with the maximum number of seven mergers occurred in years 1999 and 2000.
Next, I use the following procedure to ﬁnd control ﬁrms. To ensure control ﬁrms are
not aﬀected by the mergers as well, I exclude ﬁrm-year observations (seven years) of the
treated ﬁrms surrounding the merger events from the potential control ﬁrm list. I then
require that control ﬁrms also have a loan outstanding borrowed from either the acquiring
lender or the target lender (but not from both) at the time of the merger. Restricting
control ﬁrms to those who also borrow from the merging lenders ensures that unobservable
characteristics of the merging lenders do not drive the results. To make treated and control
ﬁrms more comparable, I then follow a similar procedure as in Hong and Kacperczyk (2010)
and Derrien and Kecske´s (2013) to reﬁne the set of control ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, I require
control ﬁrms to be in the same two-digit SIC industries and to be in the same terciles sorted
based on total assets, Tobin’s Q, and cash ﬂow as their treated counterparts. This procedure
produces a sample of 3,226 control ﬁrms.
The empirical methodology requires specifying a time window around the merger dates.
In choosing the appropriate time window, the trade-oﬀ is always between a long window that
may incorporate information unrelated to the merger and a short window that may contain
too few observations. In the baseline speciﬁcation, I choose a six-year window, which contains
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three years before the merger and three years after the merger. To ensure clean identiﬁcation,
I discard ﬁrm ﬁscal years during which the merger occurred. In robustness checks, I also try
two-year and four-year windows and ﬁnd similar results.
The ﬁnal step of sample construction involves matching both treated and control ﬁrms
in the sample with their ﬁnancial information in Compustat and detailed loan information
from DealScan. In particular, I extract loan renegotiation information from the facility
amendment ﬁle in DealScan.
3.2 Identiﬁcation Strategy
I use the mergers between lenders participated in the same syndicated loans as exogenous
shocks to the numbers of lenders the ﬁrms have and hence to the ability to renegotiate
loan contracts. Loan contract renegotiations, especially those involving loan amount, loan
maturity, or loan interest rate, often require unanimous consent of all lenders participated
in the loan (Wight, Cooke, and Gray 2009 and Nikolaev 2015). Because each single lender
can hold up the renegotiation, increasing the number of lenders makes such renegotiations
more diﬃcult (Gertner and Scharfstein 1991, Berglo¨f and Von Thadden 1994, Bolton and
Scharfstein 1996, and Bris and Welch 2005). When two lenders of the same ﬁrm merge,
the total number of lenders decreases by one and therefore the ability to renegotiate loan
contracts increases. On the other hand, lenders often lend to hundreds of ﬁrms at each
point in time and are therefore unlikely to make merger decisions based on factors related
to one particular borrower. As such, the mergers between lenders are likely to satisfy both
the relevance and the exclusion conditions. In this paper, I therefore treat the mergers as
natural experiments and examine their impact on corporate investment.
To identify the causal eﬀect of lender mergers on investment, I adopt the diﬀerence-in-
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diﬀerences speciﬁcation as follows:
Yit = αij + αt + βTreatij × Postijt + γXit−1 + ijt, (1)
where Yit is capital investment of ﬁrm i in year t; Treatij equals one if ﬁrm i is a treated ﬁrm
in merger j, and zero otherwise; Postijt equals one if the ﬁrm year observation is after the
announcement of merger j; αij is the merger-ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects; αt is the year ﬁxed eﬀects; and
Xit−1 is a vector of control variables. In this speciﬁcation, Treatij and Postijt are subsumed
by the merger-ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and the year ﬁxed eﬀects, respectively. I use merger-ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects instead of just ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects because a ﬁrm can be a treated ﬁrm in one
merger and a control ﬁrm in another. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences coeﬃcient estimate β
captures the marginal eﬀect of the merger in aﬀecting corporate investment. To account
for the potential correlation between ﬁrms aﬀected by the same merger, I cluster standard
errors by merger in all estimation results reported below. However, the results are robust if
I instead cluster standard errors by ﬁrm or merger-ﬁrm pair.
3.3 Variables and Summary Statistics
I use the facility amendment ﬁle in DealScan to construct variables of renegotiation. I
ﬁrst deﬁne Renegotiation as the total number of loan renegotiations within the ﬁscal year;
I deﬁne Material Change as the number of loan renegotiations that aﬀect the amount of
credit, pricing, or maturity; I ﬁnally deﬁne Pricing Change, Maturity Change, and Credit
Change as the number of loan renegotiations that aﬀect pricing, maturity, and the amount
of credit, respectively.
I use Capex, deﬁned as capital expenditure (CAPX) scaled by lagged total assets (AT),
to measure corporate investment. I focus on capital expenditure because capital expenditure
13
investment is more likely to be subject to debt overhang. Capital expenditure investment is
likely to beneﬁt both shareholders and creditor as it increases the tangible assets that can
be taken over by creditors in the event of bankruptcy. R&D investment, on the other hand,
is riskier and may only beneﬁt shareholders often at the expense of creditors. As shown in
Billett, King, and Mauer (2004), mergers and acquisitions destroy both shareholder value
and bondholder value. I therefore expect the debt overhang eﬀect to be more pronounced
on capital expenditure than R&D investment and mergers and acquisitions.
The control variables include: Tobin’s Q —market value of total assets (PRCC F×CSHO-
CEQ+AT) divided by book value of total assets (AT), Cash Flow — operating cash ﬂow
(IB+DP) scaled by total assets (AT), Leverage – total debt (DLTT + DLC) scaled by total
assets (AT), and Sale Growth — the growth rate of sales (SALE). Except for Cash Flow,
which is contemporaneous, other control variables are all lagged by one year.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis. An
average ﬁrm in the sample has a 10% chance of renegotiating its loan contract each year.
Similar to the ﬁndings in Roberts (2015), about half of these renegotiations involving loan
pricing, maturity, or amount changes. The table shows that the average capital expenditure
investment is about 9.7%. The average Tobin’s Q is 1.74, which is similar to the average
Tobin’s Q of the Compustat universe. The average leverage ratio is about 30.1%, which is
slightly higher than an average Compustat ﬁrm.
4 Main Results
4.1 Lender Merger and Loan Renegotiation
In this subsection, I ﬁrst examine the impact of the lender mergers on loan renegotiations.
The renegotiation eﬃciency hypothesis argues that lender mergers, by reducing the number
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of lenders, make renegotiation easier, and hence positively aﬀect corporate investment. The
hypothesis holds only if the lender mergers truly aﬀect loan renegotiations, that is, the
relevance condition is satisﬁed.
To test, I replace the dependent variable in Equation (1) with measures of loan renego-
tiation. The results are presented in Table 3. In columns (1) and (2), I present the results
for Renegotiation, the total number of loan renegotiations during the ﬁscal year, both with
and without the control variables. In both columns, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates,
that is, the coeﬃcients on Treat×Post, are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting
that loan renegotiations are more likely to happen for treated ﬁrms after the mergers.
In columns (3) and (4), I then focus on loan renegotiations that often require unanimous
lender consent, that is, renegotiations that lead to changes in pricing, maturity, or the
amount of credit (Wight, Cooke, and Gray 2009 and Nikolaev 2015), which I call Material
Change. The decrease of the number of lenders due to the mergers is likely to have a stronger
eﬀect on renegotiations that require unanimous consent. Consistent with this argument, the
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are again positive and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting
that lender mergers have a positive eﬀect on loan renegotiations that likely require unanimous
lender consent. In contrast, loan renegotiations not involving loan pricing, maturity, or
amount often do not require unanimous consent and can be decided either by the lead
lender or a simple majority. In these cases, the mergers, which decrease the number of
lenders by one, should have a smaller eﬀect. I therefore replace the dependent variable in
Equation (1) with Non-Material Change, the number of loan renegotiations not involving
loan pricing, maturity, or amount. The results are presented in columns (5) and (6). In
contrast to the results in columns (1)-(4), the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are much
smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the lender mergers has almost no eﬀect
on loan renegotiations that do not require unanimous lender consent.
15
I then examine the impact of the lender mergers on loan renegotiations involving loan
pricing, maturity, and amount separately, and the results are presented in columns (7)-(12).
Consistent with the argument that the lender mergers should make these loan renegotiations
easier, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Overall, the results in Table 3 suggest that the mergers between the lenders of the same
ﬁrm do make loan renegotiations, especially those require unanimous consent, easier.
4.2 Lender Merger and Capital Investment
I present the baseline results of estimating Equation (1) in Table 4. In column (1), I
present the results without any control. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate, that is, the
coeﬃcient on Treat×Post, is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In column
(2), I then include Tobin’s Q as the only control variable in the regression because Tobin’s Q
is often considered the suﬃcient statistic for investment. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences esti-
mate remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Finally in columns (3), I further include
Cash Flow, Leverage and Sale Growth as additional controls. The literature (for exam-
ple, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen 1988) often argues that corporate investment responds
positively to internally generated cash ﬂow if the ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained. I include
Leverage because it may capture the level eﬀect of debt overhang (Lang, Ofek, and Stulz
1996). I include Sale Growth to capture investment opportunities that may not be cap-
tured by Tobin’s Q. Nonetheless, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate remains positive and
statistically signiﬁcant.
The eﬀect is also economically signiﬁcant. The mergers increase capital expenditure
expenses by about 1.5 percentage points, which is more than 16% of the sample mean.
Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that lender mergers increase capital expenditure
investment by treated ﬁrms relative to control ﬁrms.
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4.3 Lender Merger, Renegotiation, and Capital Investment: An
Instrumental Variable Approach
This subsection investigates whether easier loan renegotiations triggered by the lender
mergers cause the response of capital investment as documented above. To achieve this
goal, I combine the intuitions from the above two subsections in an instrumental variable
estimation framework, that is, I estimate the following equation:
Yit = αij + αt + βRenegotiation+ γXit−1 + ijt, (2)
using Treat× Post as the instrument for measures of renegotiation. In this framework, the
results presented in Table 3 are the ﬁrst-stage estimation results, and the results presented
in Table 4 are the reduced form estimation results. Equation (2) is the structural equation of
interest and β captures the marginal eﬀect of the exogenous component of loan renegotiation
driven by the lender mergers on capital investment.
Because the ﬁrst-stage regressions are essential those presented in Table 3, I only present
the second-stage regression results in Table 5, with columns (1)-(3) using Renegotiation
as the renegotiation measure and columns (4)-(6) using Material Change as the renegoti-
ation measure. In all columns, the coeﬃcient estimates on the renegotiation measures are
all positive and statistically signiﬁcant,2 suggesting that the exogenous component of loan
renegotiations triggered by the lender mergers has a positive eﬀect on capital investment.
The result therefore further supports the renegotiation eﬃciency hypothesis that the lender
mergers make loan renegotiations easier, which then increases corporate investment.
2In fact, the estimates are equal to the reduced form estimates (Table 4) divided by the ﬁrst-stage
estimates (Table 3). The slightly smaller sample size is due to the drop of singleton group observations (i.e.,
single observations within ﬁxed eﬀects).
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4.4 Monitoring vs Renegotiation
The results above are consistent with both the renegotiation eﬃciency hypothesis and the
monitoring hypothesis. The monitoring hypothesis argues that increased lender monitoring
due to concentrated lender shares may also alleviate the debt overhang problem and increase
investment eﬃciency. The monitoring hypothesis, however, also suggests that the eﬀect, if it
exists at all, should concentrate in lender mergers involving the lead lenders because moni-
toring responsibilities are often delegated to lead lenders in syndicated loans. To distinguish
between these two diﬀerent hypotheses, I therefore examine whether the same eﬀect emerges
from merges between participant lenders.
To this end, I follow the same procedure as in Ivashina (2009) to identify lead lenders
of syndicated loans. I then exclude all treated ﬁrms for which one of the merging lenders
is a lead lender. I then re-estimate Equation (1) on this subsample.3 If the baseline results
are driven by the monitoring hypothesis, the eﬀect should at least be much weaker on this
subsample than on the full sample. The results are presented in Table 6. All diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences estimates are positive and statistically signiﬁcant with magnitudes similar to
those reported in Table 4, suggesting that the baseline results are not driven by mergers
involving lead lenders. The result is therefore inconsistent with the monitoring hypothesis
and favors the renegotiation eﬃciency hypothesis.
4.5 Renegotiation and Investment Eﬃciency
To provide further support to the renegotiation eﬃciency hypothesis and to show that
the increase in investment due to lender mergers improves eﬃciency, I examine whether
the eﬀects of lender mergers vary with investment opportunities ex ante. According to the
3I do not report separately the results of lender mergers involving lead lenders only because the sample
size is too small to achieve statistical power.
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renegotiation eﬃciency hypothesis, the increased ability to renegotiate loan contracts due
to the mergers should mitigate debt overhang and improve investment eﬃciency, that is, it
should increase investment of ﬁrms with more investment opportunities, but not necessarily
of ﬁrms with fewer investment opportunities. To capture the cross-sectional heterogeneity of
investment opportunities, I partition the sample into two subsamples, a low-Q subsample and
a high-Q subsample, according to whether the ﬁrm’s Tobin’s Q is below or above the sample
median. Firms in the low-Q subsample are likely to have fewer investment opportunities
than ﬁrms in the high-Q subsample.
The results of estimating Equation (1) on the low-Q and high-Q subsamples separately
are presented in Table 7, with columns (1)-(3) for the high-Q subsample and columns (4)-
(6) for the low-Q subsample. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are all positive and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level in columns (1)-(3), and the estimates are much smaller
in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant in columns (4)-(6). The diﬀerences between the
coeﬃcients, that is the diﬀerences between columns (1) and (4), columns (2) and (5), and
columns (3) and (6) are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The results suggest
that lender mergers increase investment mostly for high-Q ﬁrms, that is, ﬁrms have more
investment opportunities, which is consistent with the renegotiation eﬃciency hypothesis
that the increased ability to renegotiate loan contracts mitigates debt overhang and improves
investment eﬃciency.
4.6 Performance Pricing and Debt Overhang
Recognizing the potential agency cost of debt overhang ex post, many loan contracts
put in place covenants that may mitigate the debt overhang problem. Performance pricing
provisions contained in many loan contracts achieve exactly this goal. Performance pricing
allows loan spreads to be adjusted according to borrower performance and credit risk, that
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is, loan spreads decrease when credit risk decreases and loan spreads increase when credit
risk increases (Asquith, Beatty, and Weber 2005). As such, when ﬁrms make investment that
reduces credit risk, loan cost decreases, that is, shareholders will be capturing more beneﬁts
from such investment. As a result, shareholders’ incentives to make such investment increase.
It follows that the eﬀect of renegotiation on mitigating debt overhang will be diminished if
the loan contracts already contain the performance pricing provision.
To test this conjecture, I split the sample according to whether the loan contract contains
the performance pricing provision and re-estimate Equation (1) on the two subsamples. The
results are presented in Table 8, with columns (1)-(3) for loans without the performance pric-
ing provision and columns (4)-(6) for loans with the provision. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimates are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in columns (1)-(3) for
loans without the performance pricing provision. In contrast, the estimates are all much
smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant in columns (4)-(6) for loans with the performance pric-
ing provision. Furthermore, the diﬀerences of the estimates between those in columns (1)-(3)
and columns (4)-(6) are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The results suggest that
the performance pricing provision itself can mitigate debt overhang and hence renegotiation
adds no additional value in improving investment eﬃciency. The results lend further sup-
port to the renegotiation eﬃciency hypothesis that the positive eﬀect of lender mergers on
corporate investment is driven by its mitigation of the debt overhang problem.
4.7 Secured Loans and Debt Overhang
The debt overhang problem stems from the fact that part of the returns of investment goes
to the creditors ex post, which happens if the value of the debt is sensitive to performance or
credit risk of the ﬁrm. Secured debt is arguably less sensitive to changes in ﬁrm performance
and credit risk because secured debt holders have access to the collateral, whose value is
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often not sensitive to future investment. In fact, Stulz and Johnson (1985) show that issuing
secured debt can resolve the debt overhang problem. It follows that the eﬀect of renegotiation
in mitigating debt overhang will be limited if the loan is secured.
To this end, I split the sample according to whether the loan is secured and re-estimate
Equation (1) on the non-secured and secured loan subsamples to test this conjecture. The
results are presented in Table 9, with columns (1)-(3) for the unsecured loan subsample and
columns (4)-(6) for the secured loan subsample. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates in
columns (1)-(3) are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. In contrast, the
estimates in columns (4)-(6) are much smaller in magnitude and are statistically insigniﬁ-
cant. Furthermore, the diﬀerences of the estimates between those in columns (1)-(3) and
columns (4)-(6) are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The results are consistent with
the argument that borrowers of secured loans are less subject to the debt overhang problem
because values of secured loans mostly depend on collateral values and are relatively less
sensitive to future investment. The results therefore provide further support to the renego-
tiation eﬃciency hypothesis that the increased ability to renegotiate loan contracts due to
lender mergers mitigate debt overhang mainly for ﬁrms borrowing unsecured debt.
5 Placebo and Robustness Tests
5.1 The Parallel Trend Condition
The identiﬁcation of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences method relies on the parallel trend con-
dition, that is, outcome variables move in parallel trends in the absence of the treatment.
While the parallel trend condition is non-testable, I follow the advice in Roberts and Whited
(2012) to conduct a visual examination of the condition by plotting the outcome variable,
Capex, of the treated and control ﬁrms over the six-year window. The result is presented in
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Figure 1. First, capital investment of both the treated and control ﬁrms decreases over time,
which is a common trend among all Compustat ﬁrms (Fu, Huang, and Wang 2015). Second,
while the control ﬁrms continue their trend before the mergers, the treated ﬁrms’ capital
investment decreases at a much slower rate after the mergers, which is consistent with the
hypothesis that the lender mergers have a positive eﬀect on capital investment.
5.2 A Falsiﬁcation Test
To further ensure that the baseline results are not driven by pre-existing trend diﬀerences
between treated and control ﬁrms, I conduct a diagnostic falsiﬁcation test. For each merger
in the sample, I create a ﬁctional merger that occurs four years before the actual merger.
At the same time, I maintain the assignment of the treated and control ﬁrms, that is, the
treated and control ﬁrms in the placebo test are the same treated and control ﬁrms as those
in the baseline tests. I also focus on a six-year window around the ﬁctional mergers, that is,
three years before and three years after the ﬁctional mergers. I then estimate the following
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences speciﬁcation using the ﬁctional merger events as the treatment:
Yit = αij + αt + βTreatij × Pseudo Postijt + γXit−1 + ijt, (3)
where all variables are deﬁned exactly the same as those in Equation (1), except for Pseudo Post,
which equals one if the ﬁrm-year observation is after the ﬁctional merger, and zero otherwise.
Under this speciﬁcation, β captures the eﬀect of the ﬁctional lender mergers. If the
baseline results are driven by pre-existing trend diﬀerences between treated and control
ﬁrms, the eﬀect is also likely to show up in the placebo test.
The results of the placebo test are presented in Table 10. In all columns, the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences estimates are negative and statistically insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the baseline
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results are not driven by treated ﬁrms having an increasing trend of capital expenditure
investment relative to control ﬁrms in the absence of the lender mergers. The results indicate
(but do not prove) that the parallel trend condition is likely to be satisﬁed because a similar
positive eﬀect of the ﬁctional mergers on capital expenditure should be observed otherwise.
5.3 R&D Investment and Acquisition Expenses
An alternative explanation of the positive eﬀect of lender mergers on capital investment
is that the lenders foresee the growth potentials of their borrowers and proactively pursue
mergers, or more generally, lender mergers are correlated with unobservable borrower growth
opportunities. The average Q measure (as opposed to the marginal Q) used as the control in
the regressions is at best a proxy for investment opportunities, and as shown in Erickson and
Whited (2000), the average Q is measured with substantial measurement error. Furthermore,
lenders often get access to private information, which may include information on growth
opportunities that are not captured by Q, which is only based on public information. To
mitigate such concerns, I examine, in this subsection, whether lender mergers also aﬀect
corporate R&D expenses and acquisition expenses. To the extent that lender mergers are
correlated with unobservable growth opportunities, it should also aﬀect R&D expenses and
acquisition expenses. On the other hand, however, if the positive eﬀect of lender mergers
on capital investment is only driven by reduced debt overhang, the lender mergers may not
have a similar impact on R&D investment and acquisition expenses. On the one hand, R&D
investment is often risky and does not always result in assets that can be accessed by the
lenders, that is, R&D investment may not beneﬁt creditors and is therefore less likely to
be subject to debt overhang. On the other hand, as shown in Billett, King, and Mauer
(2004), acquisitions often hurt both the shareholders and creditors of the acquirers, and are
therefore also less likely to be subject to debt overhang. As such, lender mergers, if they aﬀect
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capital investment only via the debt overhang channel, they should not signiﬁcantly aﬀect
R&D investment and acquisition expenses the same way as they aﬀect capital expenditure
investment.
I therefore replace the dependent variable in Equation (1) with R&D, deﬁned as R&D
expense (XRD) divided by lagged total assets (AT), and Acquisition, deﬁned as acquisition
expense (AQC) divided by lagged total assets. The results are presented in Table 11, with
columns (1)-(3) for R&D and columns (4)-(6) for Acquisition. Focusing on the results for
R&D expenses ﬁrst, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are all statistically insigniﬁcant,
suggesting that lender mergers do not have large impact on R&D expense. For acquisition
expenses, all estimates are negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The results
are not consistent lender mergers being correlated with unobservable investment opportuni-
ties because, if so, lender mergers should also positively aﬀect R&D expenses and acquisition
expenses. The negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on Acquisition may come from in-
creased lender monitoring due to more concentrated lender shares, which prevents managers
from pursuing acquisitions that destroy both shareholder and creditor values. Overall, the
results in Table 11 suggest that the baseline results are unlikely to be driven by the correla-
tion between lender mergers and unobservable investment opportunities, and are therefore
consistent with the renegotiation eﬃciency hypothesis.
5.4 Diﬀerent Test Windows
A ﬁnal concern is that the six-year window over which I conduct the empirical analysis
may be too long. A longer window may include confounded factors that also aﬀect corporate
investment and therefore may introduce bias into the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates. To
mitigate this concern, I try two shorter windows, a four-year window, that is, two years
before and two years after the mergers, and a two-year window, that is, one year before and
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one year after the mergers, to assess the robustness of the baseline results. The results are
presented in Table 12, with columns (1)-(3) for the four-year window and columns (4)-(6) for
the two-year window. In all columns, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates are all positive
and statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 10% level and the coeﬃcient estimates are no
smaller, if not larger, than those reported in Table 4. The drop in statistical signiﬁcance
for the two-year window is probably due to the decrease in the number of observations and
hence the decrease in statistical power. Overall, the results in Table 12 alleviate the concern
that the baseline results are biased by confounding factors included in a too long window.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the eﬀect of the ability to renegotiate debt contract ex post on debt
overhang using mergers between lenders of the same borrower as natural experiments. I ﬁnd
that after lender mergers, eﬀected ﬁrms increase their capital expenditure investment relative
to control ﬁrms, which I attribute to the increased ability to renegotiate loan contracts
due to the reduction of the number of lenders. I ﬁnd that the eﬀect is unlikely to be
driven by increased lender monitoring because the eﬀect persists for mergers involving only
participant lenders. Further evidence shows that the eﬀect is stronger for ﬁrms with high
Q, for unsecured loans, and for loans without performance pricing provisions, all of which
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Table 1: Distribution of Lender Mergers
This table presents the annual distribution of the mergers used in this paper. The mergers
are merger and acquisition deals between lenders in the DealScan database from 1987 to
2012.























Table 2: Summary Statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of the variables used in this paper. The variables
are: Renegotiation– the total number of loan renegotiations within the ﬁscal year, Material
Change– the number of loan renegotiations aﬀecting the amount of credit, pricing, or matu-
rity; Pricing Change – the number of loan renegotiations aﬀecting pricing, Maturity Change
– the number of loan renegotiations aﬀecting maturity, and Credit Change – the number of
loan renegotiations aﬀecting the amount of credit, respectively. Capex – capital expenditure
(CAPX) scaled by lagged total assets (AT), R&D – R&D expense (XRD) scaled by lagged
total assets (AT), Acquisition – Acquisition expense (AQC) scaled by lagged total assets
(AT), Tobin’s Q – market value of total assets (PRCC F × CSHO+AT-CEQ) divided by
total assets (AT), Cash Flow – cash ﬂow (IB+DP) scaled by total assets (AT), Leverage
– total liability (DLC+DLTT) scaled by total assets (AT)Sale Growth – change in sales
(SALE) divided by lagged sales.
count mean sd p25 p50 p75
Renegotiation 23,711 0.112 0.566 0.000 0.000 0.000
Material Change 23,711 0.058 0.397 0.000 0.000 0.000
Non-Material Change 23,711 0.054 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pricing Change 23,711 0.021 0.226 0.000 0.000 0.000
Maturity Change 23,711 0.030 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000
Credit Change 23,711 0.023 0.199 0.000 0.000 0.000
Capex 23,711 9.677 15.881 3.026 5.214 9.011
R&D 14,466 4.759 7.032 0.469 2.280 5.828
Acquisition 22,136 5.174 14.724 0.000 0.036 3.287
Tobin’s Q 23,711 1.744 1.068 1.135 1.424 1.926
Cash Flow 23,711 0.078 0.088 0.049 0.086 0.123
Leverage 23,711 0.301 0.202 0.157 0.284 0.406














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Lender Mergers and Capital Investment
This table reports the baseline diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation results of Yit = αij +αt +
βTreatij × Postjt + γXit−1 + ijt. The dependent variable is Capex. Treat equals one if the
ﬁrm is a treated ﬁrm of the merger, and zero otherwise. Post equals one if the ﬁrm-year
observation is after the merger. All regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects and merger-ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered by merger. Signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Post × Treat 1.957*** 1.721*** 1.671**
(0.642) (0.633) (0.655)








Constant 46.188*** 40.453*** 41.470***
(1.757) (1.876) (1.791)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Merger-Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,711 23,711 23,711
Adjusted R-squared 0.462 0.482 0.488
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Table 5: Lender Merger, Loan Renegotiation, and Capital Investment: Instrumental Variable
Estimation Results
This table reports the instrumental variable estimation results of Yit = αij + αt +
βRenegotiation+ γXit−1 + ijt using Treat× Post as the instrument for measures of rene-
gotiation. In columns (1)-(3), the renegotiation measure is Renegotiation, the total number
of loan renegotiations during the ﬁscal year; in columns (4)-(6), the renegotiation measure
is Material Change, the number of loan renegotiations aﬀecting loan pricing, maturity, or
amount. All regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects and merger-ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard
errors are clustered by merger. Signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***,
**, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Renegotiation 24.101** 20.865** 19.308**
(11.446) (10.486) (9.648)
Material Change 23.434** 20.328** 19.141**
(9.663) (9.205) (8.782)
Tobin’s Q 3.721*** 3.243*** 3.675*** 3.325***
(0.500) (0.446) (0.461) (0.438)




Sale Growth -0.384*** -0.430***
(0.125) (0.116)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Merger-Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,654 23,654 23,654 23,654 23,654 23,654
Adjusted R-squared 0.395 0.467 0.569 0.368 0.434 0.559
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Table 6: The Eﬀects of Participant Lender Mergers
This table reports the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation results of Yit = αij+αt+βTreatij×
Postjt + γXit−1 + ijt with participant lender mergers as the treatment. The dependent
variable is Capex. Treat equals one if the ﬁrm is a treated ﬁrm of the merger, and zero
otherwise. Post equals one if the ﬁrm-year observation is after the merger. All regressions
include year ﬁxed eﬀects and merger-ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered by
merger. Signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Post × Treat 1.846** 1.554** 1.491*
(0.737) (0.722) (0.761)








Constant 46.000*** 39.875*** 40.835***
(1.793) (1.930) (1.756)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Merger-Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,192 19,192 19,192






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 10: A Falsiﬁcation Test
This table reports the falsiﬁcation estimation results of Yit = αij + αt + βTreatij ×
PseudPostjt + γXit−1 + ijt. The dependent variable is Capex. Treat equals one if the
ﬁrm is a treated ﬁrm of the merger, and zero otherwise. Pseudo Post equals one if the
ﬁrm-year observation is after the ﬁctional merger, which occurs four years before the actual
merger. All regressions include year ﬁxed eﬀects and merger-ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard
errors are clustered by merger. Signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are indicated by ***,
**, and *, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
Post × Treat -0.925 -0.539 -0.706
(1.289) (0.997) (1.014)








Constant 19.473*** 10.941*** 12.028***
(1.509) (0.933) (1.119)
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Merger-Firm Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 23,300 23,300 23,300





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Capital Investment Surrounding the Mergers








−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
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42
